The Silent Strangulation of Peace

In international relations, a war typically ends when its costs become too high for both parties to bear. However, this premise relies on the presence of mediators who can facilitate negotiations and reach a mutually acceptable deal. When these individuals are removed, the possibility of a peaceful outcome becomes increasingly unlikely.

Sir John Sawers’ analysis highlights a disturbing trend in Israeli policy. The killing of Larijani was not merely a counter-proliferation measure but an attempt to eliminate a figure capable of negotiating a deal between Israel and Iran.

Larijani’s story is representative of a larger strategy employed by Israel in various contexts, from its dealings with Hamas and Hezbollah to its ongoing conflict with Iran. The aftermath of these killings often produces a vacuum of moderation as the successor leader is rarely more inclined towards compromise than their predecessor.

In fact, they are often harder-line figures who have survived precisely because they were less willing to negotiate. This leads to a self-reinforcing cycle: the assassination not only interrupts negotiations but also manufactures evidence that diplomacy was never possible in the first place.

Historical precedent bears out this observation. The 1948 assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations mediator for Palestine, by members of Lehi is a striking example. Similarly, the killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, Iran’s leading nuclear program figure, in November 2020, was widely seen as an attempt to scuttle diplomatic efforts.

The Larijani assassination fits this template perfectly. As Iran’s nuclear negotiator two decades ago and a key decision-maker after the Supreme Leader’s death, his removal has not only interrupted negotiations but also reinforced the perception that diplomacy is futile.

This approach extends beyond state actors to non-state adversaries as well. The Israeli strategy of removing key figures in these groups has had far-reaching consequences. The killing of Hezbollah secretary-general Abbas al-Musawi in 1992 led directly to the ascendancy of Hassan Nasrallah, a figure even more hardened and capable than his predecessor.

The logic behind this strategy is twofold. On one hand, Israel’s primary objective remains the collapse of Iran’s system as an existential threat. A negotiated accommodation with Iran would stabilize the very order that Israel seeks to undermine. On the other hand, eliminating pragmatist leaders like Larijani and Haniyeh tips the balance within Iran towards a harder line, making negotiations increasingly improbable.

The stated rationale for these killings – military necessity and preventive action – is not entirely baseless. However, it conceals a more consistent underlying goal: the elimination of politicians whose trajectories threaten Israeli security. This strategy has become an integral component of Israel’s broader approach to regional conflict.

Despite its uncertain returns, this policy appears to have been adopted as a matter of course by Israeli policymakers. The killing of Larijani and others like him raises profound questions about the efficacy of such a strategy in achieving long-term peace and stability in the region. As tensions continue to simmer between Israel and Iran, it is essential to confront the possibility that these actions may be more likely to perpetuate violence than to bring about any lasting resolution.